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We propose distributed protocol for generation of random numbers via computer systems. The protocol is 
specifically designed to fit the needs of random selection as it is performed in public sphere and is inspired by real 
problems, which are posing difficulties for Bulgarian judicial system. Random selection in public sphere is meant to be 
mechanism for increasing the transparency and reducing the possibilities of collusion between various government actors. 
Usage of computers reduces transparency and when done improperly, can lead to disastrous consequences concerning the 
public trust in the institutions of government. This protocol tries to provide technical solution to the transparency problem 
by allowing third parties to guarantee for the fairness of the random selection without giving these parties the ability to 
influence maliciously the result. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Random selection is long been used for breaking ties in tender procedures, choosing members 
of juries, commissions and panels of experts. The sought after effect of applying random selection is to 
guarantee and reinforce the fairness of a process that requires a governing body to make impartial 
decisions. Precisely because the need of transparency, computers so far have been rarely used to aid 
such random selection by providing random numbers. Yet there are applications where computers 
cannot be excluded because the volume of selections requires great many random numbers that other 
methods cannot provide.  
Usage of computers to perform random selection always invokes certain questions about the 
transparency of whole process. In more developed democracies, manipulating computer programs and 
hardware to influence random selection quite unthinkable and the general public is well disposed to 
ignore such questions. In less developed democracies though, this mechanism is prone to abuse, and 
often results exactly the opposite effect on public opinion than one envisioned.  
Such was the case with random selection, implemented in Bulgarian judicial system several 
years ago. From 2007 onwards, the random distribution of court cases to judges is handled by 
electronic means and is  mandated by Bulgarian law. This mechanism was created to address public 
fears that judges were assigned to some court cases by their superiors based on their personal and 
political loyalties, which would guarantee certain outcome of the case.  It was only at the end of 2014 
when software solutions for the implementation of this policy became the focus of public scrutiny. An 
investigation into the software solution used by majority of Bulgarian courts – LawChoice - concluded 
that, being standalone application, the solution provided little or no protection from manipulation, even 
by technically unsophisticated users. It was enough to delete the data files of the program to remove 
any traces of a choice being made trough the program. This allowed simple strategy for manipulation - 
the data files would be backed, and then the choice would be made. If it is unfavourable, the data files 
will be restored and the process will be repeated until favourable result is reached. The efforts to fix the 
software were directed towards centralization of the random selection and making deletion of the data 
file without traces harder for the users. The measures were reassuring for the general public, but from 
technical point of view, the solution remains inadequate because of the fact, that the program and the 
data still resides on single computer that can be manipulated by the party that has administrative control 
over it no matter how sophisticated software measures are developed to prevent this.  
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 We propose distributed solution to the problem of random selection that closely mimics the 
techniques used by popular distributed software on Internet. This solution itself is by no means new 
idea (it has been first investigated by Manuel Blum
[2][3]
 circa 1982), but since then it has been studied 
and applied more thoroughly only in technical context. We would like to argue that its application in 
social context has additional aspects that make some of the shortcomings of the general solution 
irrelevant. 
Given the now entrenched public distrust and allegations of corruption at higher levels of the 
judicial system in Bulgaria (and possibly many other problems, related to corruption in many different 
countries), this solution is not only mental exercise. It can be implemented on a scale, which would 
allow it to serve all other random selections just as easily, becoming somewhat similar to what 
certificate authorities are to electronic signatures today.  
The proposed protocol guarantees the generated numbers will be fair even if   of all  
participants form a coalition and act maliciously. That is, if even one of the participants adheres to the 
protocol fairly, the rest of participants cannot influence the whole process. Then the fairness of the 
process in concrete settings will be guaranteed by distributing the duties of generation to parties that are 
least likely to act in collusion.   
The aforementioned property of the protocol is subject to one very important assumption – all 
participants will be forced to finish the protocol to its end. This assumption is unreasonable when 
applied to autonomous distributed systems on Internet, where even Byzantine-style errors cannot be 
excluded, but is more realistic in situations where external arbitrage may be requested and applied, as is 
the case with social systems.   
 
2. Building blocks   
 
The problem of random selection from a list of  elements (as well as ordering such list) can be 
easily reduced to the generation of uniformly distributed integers in the interval . To create a 
scheme that distributes the process of random number generation, one must solve two principal 
problems:  
1) A technique must be found to combine the inputs from each participant. The result has to be 
a number in the desired interval and has to behave as if drawn from uniform distribution. This must 
work even if  of the total  participants form a coalition and coordinate their inputs with the goal 
of biasing the results. 
2) A technique must be found to ensure that no coalition of  of total  participants will be 
able to exploit the inevitable tiny timing lags in data transmission to introduce bias into the result. For 
example if all  participants in the coalition intentionally wait until the only remaining participant 
announces their input, this should not allow them to manipulate their own inputs in coordination to 
influence the resulting number.  
The first problem is usually solved in practice by making each party generate its own random 
number in the desired interval. Merging these can then be accomplished by use of binary XOR
[4]
. 
XORing multiple random variants, each drawn from a different distribution, ensures that the result is 
uniformly distributed, given that at least one of these distributions is uniform. So, if even a sole 
participant draws their random numbers uniformly, the resulting number will also be uniformly 
distributed. This, of course, is correct only if the desired interval for the random numbers is between 0 
and some power of 2, which ensures that XORing will not produce out of range numbers. Producing 
out of range numbers is not an issue regarding bias if they are dealt with properly (i.e. discarded), but it 
can introduce unnecessary complexity in the networking communication, which is undesirable for such 
a protocol. Luckily, this property of XOR follows from a more general result.  
As binary operation, XOR is associative and commutative and has the additional properties that 
 and  for any number . So if  and  are numbers with a length of  bits in 
binary representation, then the relation , with domain and codomain  is a 
function. Then  
 
for any , so  is its own left and right inverse. Since it has a left and right inverse,  is a bijection 
from S onto S, hence a permutation. So, if is drawn uniformly,  is not only a permutation of , but 
it is uniform, that is, given the choice of  being uniform, any possible permutation of S is equally 
likely to occur. 
The described property of XOR (namely to make the resulting distribution uniform), follows 
from the fact that it induces uniformly generated random permutation. If  is an integer in the interval 
 and  is a (uniformly generated) random permutation of the integers in the same interval, then 
the probability that  equals a particular integer  does not depend on  and  and is equal 
to . So if  are drawn according to arbitrary distribution and  are random 
permutations, then  are uniformly distributed.  
Thus, if one participant in the protocol generates an initial integer in the interval [0;k), and the 
other parties generate permutations of the integers in the same interval, then the resulting number 
 is uniformly distributed between the integers in , given that either:  
1) A is randomly drawn from uniform distribution; 
2) One of the permutations  is generated uniformly at random; 
This property exactly prescribes the operation of the protocol in respect to the generation and 
combination of each participant’s inputs. One participant will start with a uniformly distributed integer 
in the desired interval and the other participants will provide random uniformly-generated permutations 
of the integers in the same interval. Unlike XORing, this will always produce an integer in the desired 
range and will avoid unnecessary bouts of networking communication.  
This approach has one great caveat. When each participant in the protocol reveals their input, it 
has to occur at the exact moment of time as all the other participants reveal theirs. Otherwise, one or 
more of the participants may cheat the system by deferring the generation and submission of their 
inputs until they know the inputs of all other participants. They can then generate new inputs that will 
allow them to totally subvert the choice. This is, in essence, the second principal issue that the 
protocol has to overcome.  
Since such simultaneous transmission is absolutely impossible in a networked environment, 
another solution has to be found. Luckily, the solution is available in the form of commitment schemes. 
Modern commitment schemes use industry-standard one-way cryptographic hash functions and usually 
proceed in two phases.  
In the first phase, each participant generates an input (in our case, a random number) and then 
uses cryptographic hash function to compute the hash sum of this number. Next, only the hash sums of 
the inputs are exchanged between the parties. When all the participants have all hashes, the 
commitment scheme goes into its second phase and each party reveals the actual original input to the 
other. Each participant then can check the inputs against the hash sums, verifying that no participant 
has reneged on its chosen input.   
Cryptographic hash functions have three important properties that ensure that the above 
commitment scheme works correctly and binds each party to its choice, thus preventing dishonesty. 
1) Cryptographic hash functions are one-way in the sense that they exhibit first preimage 
resistance. That is, given a hash sum, it is computationally infeasible to find an input (preimage) to the 
hash function that will result as an output of exactly the given sum. Thus, a participant in our protocol, 
having only a hash sum from another participant, cannot easily deduce the value that the other 
participant has committed to.  
2) Cryptographic hash functions also exhibit collision resistance and second preimage 
resistance. Second preimage resistance guarantees that, if one has an input to the cryptographic hash 
function and the corresponding output – the hash sum of this input – it is computationally infeasible to 
find a second, different input that has the same hash sum. Collision resistance enhances this property 
even further, guaranteeing that two values with the same hash sum cannot be efficiently generated 
together by using some efficient meet-in-the-middle search approach. Thus, if a participant in our 
protocol generates a number and distributes their hash sum amongst the other participants, it will be 
impossible for them to generate (at that moment, or later) another number having the same hash sum. 
Therefore, second preimage resistance and collision resistance ensure that the participant is bound to 
their generated value once their hash is transmitted to the other participants. This efficiently solves the 
second major problem, as outlined above. 
The protocol has to deal with some additional issues concerning actual implementation. The 
significance of these problems can be described as less important only due the fact that they are well 
known, and have widely-available industry-standard implementations.  
Technologies for electronic signatures are indispensable to the protocol, assuring the 
authenticity of the messages. Current industry-standard solutions for their implementation are based on 
elliptic or Edwards curve cryptography like ECDSA
[1] 
and EdDSA
[5]
.  
Random number generators used by the participants are a highly dangerous problematic 
source for the protocol. In case there is a perfect (or true) unbiased and uncorrelated random number 
generator, the above conclusions regarding the security of the protocol do hold true. In the real world 
though, random number generators act deterministically, have slight biases, and produce auto-
correlated outputs. All these properties might be exploited by an attacker to gain advantage and subvert 
the protocol. The protocol has the disadvantage that each participant voluntarily reveals much of the 
output generated by their random number generator to all other participants. This does not immediately 
constitute a critical weakness, but invites such attacks. To avoid these and achieve a highly 
unpredictable sequence of bits, the participants should use hardware random number generators. Based 
on quantum or thermodynamic phenomena, these generators produce truly random output. This output 
may be XORed with the output of a strong pseudo-random generator such as Blum Blum Shub
[3] 
or a 
block cipher in counter mode. This will strengthen the protocol even more against such attacks.  
 
3. The protocol  
 
Our protocol assumes that the parties have agreed beforehand on a public signature scheme. 
This assumption is not unreasonable, given that the number of participants will be low enough to solve 
this problem offline and by direct contact. We also assume that all the participants’ public keys are 
properly exchanged.  
The protocol envisions two roles for the participants. A participant may be an initiator or a 
guarantor. The initiator has a central role in the protocol and only one of the participants may assume 
the role. All other participants assume the roles of guarantors. The protocol may be described by the 
following sequence of steps. 
Step 1: The initiator determines the upper bound  for the generated number and gives each draw a 
consecutive number. These two values are put into a data structure. The initiator signs this structure 
(see fig. 1) with their private key and sends it to all guarantors. 
 draw № attributes of the initiator’s electronic signature 
Fig. 1. Data structure sent by the initiator in step 1 
 
Step 2: Each guarantor, upon receiving the structure, checks the electronic signature of the initiator 
and the number of the draw (each guarantor should keep a record of previous draws and therefore 
has to know the number of each next draw). If the electronic signature and the number are correct, 
each guarantor signs the data structure with his private key, adding the necessary attributes. (See. 
fig. 2). 
 draw № attributes of the initiator’s 
electronic signature  
attributes of the guarantor’s 
electronic signature 
Fig. 2. Data structure returned to the initiator from each guarantor at step 2 
 
Subsequently, the guarantor returns the signed structure to the initiator. If the electronic signature or 
the numbers are incorrect, the guarantor stops participation in the further execution of the protocol. 
This can occur with a signed message indicating an error, or silently, which will result in the 
protocol’s abortion. When actually implemented, all systems should be stopped at this moment and 
audited so that the reason for the fault can be discovered.  
Step 3: After the initiator obtains all copies of the structure in step 2, the initiator checks the 
signatures of the guarantors and aggregates all structures into one, signing it again with its own 
signature. (see fig. 3).  
 draw № attributes of the initiator’s 
electronic signature 
attributes of guarantor 1’s electronic 
signature 
... ... ... ... 
 draw № attributes of the initiator’s 
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attributes of guarantor n’s electronic 
signature 
attributes of the initiator’s electronic signature (this signature covers the whole structure) 
Fig. 3. Data structure distributed by the initiator at step 3 
 
This structure is sent to all guarantors and the initiator then continues to step 5.  
Step 4: Upon receiving the structure, each guarantor checks the electronic signatures. Upon 
incorrect verification, the guarantor stops any further participation in the draw.  
Step 5: The initiator generates an integer in the range  and enters it into data structure, which 
includes a long enough sequence of bits, chosen at random, to play the role of cryptographic “salt”. 
The number of the draw is also added to this structure.  
The structure remains hidden for the moment, but on conversion to the contents to bits, the 
guarantor executes the protocol cryptographic hash function (i.e. SHA-3) chosen for the purpose. 
The resulting hash sum is signed by the initiator and sent to all guarantors (see fig. 4) 
draw № hash sum attributes of the initiator’s electronic signature 
Fig. 4. Data structure distributed by the initiator to all the guarantors at step 5. 
 
Step 6: Upon receiving the structure at step 5, every guarantor signs the structure with their own 
private key and returns it to the initiator. 
draw № hash sum attributes of the initiator’s attributes of the guarantor’s 
electronic signature  electronic signature  
Fig. 5. Data structure returned from each guarantor to the initiator at step 6 
 
Step 7: Upon receiving all copies of the structure from step 6, the initiator aggregates them and 
signs them once again: 
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Fig 6. Data structure distributed from the initiator at step 7 
 
Afterwards, the initiator sends the structure to all guarantors. 
Step 8: Upon receiving the structure from step 7, every guarantor checks the electronic signatures. 
If the signatures do not match, the guarantor stops any further participation in the draw. 
Step 9: Each guarantor generates a random permutation of the integers in the interval [0;k) and 
stores it in a data structure that includes the number of the draw and a long enough sequence of bits, 
chosen at random, to serve as cryptographic “salt”. This structure remains hidden for the 
moment from the rest of the participants. The guarantor computes the hash sum of the data in the 
structure. The guarantor signs the sum and the number of the draw and sends them to the initiator.  
draw № hash sum attributes of the guarantor’s electronic signature 
Fig 7. Data structure sent by each of the guarantors on step 9 
 
Step 10: Upon receiving all structures from the guarantors, the initiator aggregates and signs them. 
Then it is sent to the guarantors.  
draw № hash sum of guarantor 1 attributes of guarantor 1’s electronic 
signature  
... ... ... 
draw № hash sum of guarantor n attributes of guarantor n’s electronic 
signature  
attributes of the initiator’s electronic signature (this signature covers the whole structure) 
Fig 8. Data structure disseminated by the initiator to all guarantors at step 10 
 
Step 11: Upon receiving the structure from step 10, each guarantor signs it and then returns it to the 
initiator.  
draw № hash sum of guarantor 1 attributes of guarantor 1’s electronic 
signature 
... ... ... 
draw № hash sum of guarantor n attributes of guarantor n’s electronic 
signature 
attributes of the initiator’s electronic signature (this signature covers the whole 
structure) 
attributes of the guarantor’s electronic signature (this signature covers the whole 
structure, including the attributes of the initiator’s signature) 
Fig 9. Data structure returned from the guarantors to the initiator at step 11 
 When the initiator has received each copy of the structure from step 11, each party has committed 
to a chosen number or permutation. Moreover, the hash sums so far are correctly distributed 
amongst all participants. Each participant can verify this, because a correct structure at step 11 
would mean that each guarantor has checked and agreed on the accuracy of all sums and signatures.  
An error in the protocol up to this moment would mean interrupting the draw without the possibility 
of any coalition between  participants in order to learn the details of the remaining 
participant’s number.  
Step 12: The initiator reveals the contents of the secret structure from step 5 and sends it to all 
guarantors, signing it with its electronic signature.  
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random number 
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Fig 10. Data structure disseminated from the initiator to all guarantors at step 12 
 
Step 13: Each guarantor reveals the contents of the secret structure from step 9 and sends it to the 
initiator, signing it with their electronic signature.  
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draw № random permutation of 
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attributes of the guarantor’s 
electronic signature  
Fig 11. Data structure sent from the guarantors to the initiator at step 13 
 
Step 14: Upon receiving all copies of the structure from step 9, the initiator aggregates this 
structure into one, signs it, and sends it to all guarantors.  
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Fig 12. Data structure sent from the initiator to each guarantor at step 14 
 
 
Step 15: Each site checks the structure from step 14 and, upon correct verification, generates the 
permutation . Applying  to the initiator’s random number produces the end 
result – an integer in the interval [0; k).  
Each participant should then publish the details of this generated process to a publically 
accessible register, along with the structures exchanged at each point (this would probably be 
implemented as a set of web pages). The registers of all participants must all agree on the chosen 
value. To be more useful, the whole process may be preceded by a round where the lists of judges 
are agreed on by all parties. It may even be transformed into a scheme that takes into account each 
judge’s load. For example, the uniform numbers that are generated must be used as a source for 
transformation into another distribution.  
 
4. Threats to the security of the protocol  
 
There are several main threats to the security of the protocol:  
 an attempt by a participant to renege on a value that was committed to at an earlier stage; 
 an attempt to reveal the hidden values at steps 5 and 9 by using dictionary attacks, before the 
corresponding participant has revealed them to the others;  
 refusal to participate in the protocol; 
 the replay of traffic from previous draws in an attempt to subvert the protocol. 
The issue of replaying old messages (replay attacks) concerns the possibility that a participant 
could present messages from a previous draw - which would have a valid electronic signature - as new. 
To prevent this, all the structures of the protocol have a draw number and each party has to maintain a 
register of previous draws. The existence of a draw number ensures security in case of replay attacks 
only if all parties react correctly to it. Upon receiving an incorrect draw number, the party that has 
received it must discontinue participation and initiate offline audits to discover the cause and 
resynchronize the register. This behaviour is reasonable, since an occurrence of such errors during 
normal operation with several data centres / servers should be reasonably low. It is more probable that 
such an error would occur far earlier to step 11 of the protocol. After that, it becomes a strong 
indication of dishonesty. 
Dictionary attacks rely on the fact that one and the same input to the cryptographic hash 
function always generates the same hash sum. For example, an SHA3 hash of “1” will always be 
“c89efdaa54c0f20c7adf612882df0950f5a951637e0307cdcb4c672f298b8bc6”. Since the integer 
numbers that will be used by the protocol do not present a large enough search space, it is not hard for 
an adversary to calculate hashes of all of these numbers and enter these in a table, known as a 
“dictionary”. Subsequently, when a participant in the protocol announces their hash sum, an adversary 
may try to perform a reverse lookup in this dictionary to find the number. To prevent this, the search 
space is expanded by adding a pseudo-random sequence of bits of sufficient length. The ultra-safe 
threshold is around 512 bits long, which would force the attacker to compute (and store) well over  
different inputs, which is totally infeasible. 
The issue of one party reneging on an input they have committed to has already been 
covered when discussing the building blocks of the protocol. It must be noted that the cryptographic 
hash function used in the protocol has to be strong. MD5, SHA1 and SHA-256 have been seriously 
weakened by developments in cryptanalysis and ever increasing computing power, therefore it appears 
that most appropriate cryptographic hash function is currently SHA3. 
The most dangerous threat from a practical point of view is the possibility that a 
participant could sabotage the protocol before or after committing to a value. After step 11 of the 
protocol, each party has committed to a value. Simulating a network or system error after this step 
would be difficult. If a network error occurs and a number of participants drop out, the protocol could 
be discontinued and finished offline in the presence of arbiters. Each party already has the committed 
values and it is reasonable to accept that each party should keep logs of its activities. In addition, we 
can assume that its data centre should be fault tolerant enough to make it extremely unlikely for a 
participant to lose their own value, thus rendering offline execution impossible.  
Sabotage of the protocol before step 11 would not lead to any possibility for bias in the result, but it 
would make reaching any result impossible. Single errors of this type are not a serious problem, but 
continuous errors would prevent the protocol from working at all. When such an event occurs, it can 
rarely be attributed to one particular participant. For example,  participants can enter a coalition 
to “frame” the sole remaining participant. This is why, in such cases, audits and inspection should be 
carried out on every data centre. This limits the maximum count of participants in the protocol. It is 
impossible for such a protocol to be executed with participants in the order of tens or hundreds, because 
audits would become a logistic nightmare. 3 to 5 participants are probably the optimum here, which is 
more than enough in the case of the judicial system.  
This analysis shows the direction in which practical implementations of the protocol to 
Bulgarian judicial system can be developed. It is impossible for a system based on the protocol to make 
each single regional court a participant in the system, so a solution based on the protocol would be 
centralized, but would rely on several guarantors who can be associated with an executive branch (i.e. 
the Ministry of Justice), the Ombudsman Institution, the Presidency, EU Institutions and so on.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The proposed protocol demonstrates how a method that can find such successful application in 
so purely a technical field as peer-to-peer systems can be applied almost without adaptation to 
outstanding issues in the field of public governance. It must be noted, though, that practical 
implementation may run into unexpected caveats. Is it true, for example, that constant sabotage of the 
protocol is impossible? What if such a system only works when there are accredited arbiters and 
auditors and immediately afterwards starts misbehaving again, generating constant early aborts 
(obviously, because some participant tries hard to sabotage and discredit it in its entirety). Is it 
practically possible to find and accuse such a participant in a way that is indisputable for the general 
public? Will internal strife and potential non-cooperation in the parties itself be enough to overcome 
technical efforts to keep the system running?  
If such a protocol is to be implemented correctly, a decision should be made as to if each data 
centre should work with its own software or if all data centres will use one and the same. In the latter 
case, it would become easier for a party that finds an error in the software to subvert all participants. 
The most serious unknown may be related to the fact that cryptography is unfamiliar to the general 
public and the conjectured effect of increasing its trust in the random character of selection may not 
materialize at all.  
These questions regarding the protocol can be answered only if the practical implementation of 
such a system is attempted. For the moment, this looks unlikely, but nonetheless the possibility of 
constructing such a system must be mentioned and considered in case current electronic distribution 
systems continue to fail to deter potential transgressions.  
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